Abstract-In this paper, we propose a large universe ciphertextpolicy attribute based encryption (ABE) scheme with efficient revocation. To achieve the revocation, we divide the master key into two parts: delegation key and secret key, which are sent to the cloud provider and user separately. Note that, our scheme is proved selectively secure in the standard model under q-type assumption. Finally, we give the concrete analysis associated with our scheme including security requirements, functionality and performance.
INTRODUCTION
Attribute Based Encryption (ABE), which was first proposed by Sahai et al. [1] in 2005, has been developed as a cryptographic primitive to achieve fine-grained access control for encrypted data. In ABE, the user can specify the access control policy for encrypted data over a set of attributes, and each user will be issued the corresponding private key from an authority center that reflects the attributes they have. A user will be able to decrypt the ciphertext only if the attributes corresponding to their private satisfy the access control policy ascribed to the ciphertext. Since then, several ABE constructions have been proposed. Goyal et al. proposed an expressive Key-Policy ABE(KP-ABE) scheme, and formalized the notion of Ciphertext-Policy ABE(CP-ABE) [2] followed by other CP-ABE schemes [3] [4] [5] and KP-ABE schemes [6] [7] [8] . However, a limitation of these ABE schemes is that the system parameters must be chosen at the setup phase, which cannot offer complex flexibility. Lewko et al. first solved this problem by introducing a classification of ABE schemes: small universe and large universe [9] . In the small universe schemes, the size of attribute size is polynomial to the system parameter and must be set at the initial phase. More importantly, the public parameters increase linearly with the size of the universe. In the large universe ABE schemes, the attribute universe can be arbitrarily large and the public parameters can keep constant. Afterwards, Rouselakis et al. proposed two large universe ABE schemes (one CP-ABE and one KP-ABE) on prime order groups and proved secure under q-type assumptions in the standard model [10] . However, it does not involve the attribute revocation which is critical to cloud storage environment. Since each attribute can be shared by multiple users, so the scheme devised must ensure that the revocation will not affect other users in the attribute group.
The fine-grained attribute revocation has got extensive application in many practical ABE schemes. Bethencourt et al. first solved this issue by adding an expiration time to the users' attributes [3] which disabled a user's secret key at a designated time. Next, Yu et al. proposed the first formal key revocation scheme [11] , where a proxy performs the re-encryption. The key revocation algorithm relies on an asymmetric algorithm, which limits its efficiency for large data. So it is only suitable for re-encrypting short data. Xie et al. proposed an efficient attribute revocation scheme [12] which used the encryption key tree for each user. The new generated key is used to re-encrypt all the ciphertext by the CSP, which may cause high computation cost. Yang et al. aslo proposed an attribute revocation scheme [13] by using the authority center to update ciphertext and generate new keys including secret new and updating key. However, this scheme poses high computation cost on the authority center and brings high communication cost between the authority center and users. Additionally, all these schemes are designed for ABE with small universe, which limits its extensive application.
In this paper, we propose an efficient and revocable CP-ABE scheme that combines proxy re-encryption method to achieve the attribute revocation. In this scheme, we achieve the revocation with the help of CSP, which offloads most of revocation operations for the authority. The keys are divided into two forms: the secret key for user and the delegation key for CSP, and the delegation key is used to re-encrypt the ciphertext. Only the users whose attributes satisfy the access structure, can update the secret keys and further decrypt the reencrypted ciphertext.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we shortly introduce some background information for this paper, including bilinear maps, access structure and q-type assumption. 
A. Bilinear Maps

Definition 1. (Bilinear Map
C. q-type Assumption
The assumption is proved via the following game between a challenger and an attacker which is demonstrated as follows: 
Definition 3.
We say that q-type assumption holds if polynomial algorithm has a non-negligible advantage to break the above security game, where the advantage is defined as | Pr(
III. DEFINITION AND SECURITY MODEL
A. Construction
In this section, we propose our revocable large universe CP-ABE scheme partially based on Rouselakis et al.' construction [10] as follows: 
Finally, the public key PK is set as
The master key MK is set as 1 2 ( , )
The key generation algorithm firstly randomly chooses 1 k + exponents 1 2 , , ,..., 
, where s is the secret to be shared.
Finally, the ciphertext is published as
, where
Re-encrypt ( ( , ) , ,
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Therefore, the re-encrypted ciphertext is set as
. In addition, the reencryption algorithm will generate the updated delegation key as
If there is an attribute x revoked from a user ( , ) , ,
. In addition, the reencryption algorithm also generates the updated delegation key as 
B. Correctness
In this part, we will validate the correctness of our proposed scheme by the following equations.
If there is no attribute revoked, then we have 
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Note that r is distributed correctly because of the randomness of t . Next, B computes the key components as follows:
According to the definition of t and 1 1 w = -, we know K . In detail, it is constructed as follows:
will compute the key component 
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Finally, B sets CT  to the attacker A .
Challenge:
The attacker A submits to the challenger B two messages 0 m and 1 m with the equal length. Then B selects a random coin {0 ,1}
the access policy associated with the ciphertext, then the user cannot recover ( , ) rs e g w during the initial decryption process, thus the ciphertext cannot be decrypted successfully. In addition, when a user is revoked from some attribute groups, then he cannot decrypt the ciphertext Ĉ to obtain the key material for updating the corresponding key. Therefore, the revoked user cannot decrypt the ciphertext. Finally, we assume the CSP is honest but curious. However, it is only authorized to re-encrypt the ciphertext and cannot obtain the decryption key. Thus, the CSP cannot decrypt the ciphertext also.
2)
Collusion resistance:
Assume an attacker does not hold the attribute ( ) i  .
According to the previous CP-ABE schemes, we know that the secret key s is embedded in the ciphertext rather than the key. In order to decrypt the ciphertext, a colluding attacker needs to obtain ( , ) rs e g w . However, the attacker must pair cannot be obtained by doing so since user's key is uniquely generated by a random exponent r .
3)
Forward security:
Assume a user is revoked from an attribute group, namely he cannot decrypt the ciphertext Ĉ to obtain the key material for updating the corresponding key. Therefore, the revoked user cannot decrypt any components corresponding the attributes after his revocation.
4)
Backward security:
Assume a user joins an attribute group that satisfy the access policy associated with the ciphertext. Even if the user can update his secret key and obtains the previous ciphertext, he still cannot decrypt the ciphertext successfully. That is because the user's secret key is updated with a new random v  and k .Therefore, the backward security of the shared data is achieved in our proposed scheme. The functionality comparison is demonstrated in Table 1 , from which can see that Liang's scheme, Hur's scheme and Yang's scheme achieve small universe, namely the size of the attribute space is bounded with the security parameter and attributes are fixed at setup, moreover, the size of the public parameters grows linearly with the number of attributes. However, our scheme achieves large universe, namely the size of the attribute universe can be exponentially large, which is a desirable feature. In addition, compared with the generic group model of Hur's scheme and the random oracle model of Yang's scheme, Liang's scheme and our scheme are provably secure based on the stand assumption in the standard model, which have stronger security.
B. Functionality
